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Abstract 
The impact of environmental regulation on innovation is of central interest to many industries 
and policy makers alike. While traditional research adopts a top-down view of regulation and 
attempts to measure the innovation response, the more bottom-up view of contemporary 
theory argues that firms produce innovations that exceed compliance levels as a competitive 
strategy. We approach this dichotomy by investigating innovation introduced by Australian 
oil and gas firms in light of environmental regulatory compliance burden and firm-level 
characteristics, including competitive capabilities. Analyses of survey responses, executive-
level interviews and conference proceedings reveal both regulatory (top-down) and 
competitive advantage (bottom-up) perspectives explain innovation in this industry. 
Regression analyses reveal that product/service and novel innovations (all types) are related 
to a high compliance burden, competitive skills, research and development activity, and 
engagement in formal collaborations. Interview and conference data add nuance to our 
findings revealing collaborative compliance frameworks result in similar innovation 
outcomes. 
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Environmental regulation, innovation, oil and gas 
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1 Introduction  
The Australian oil and gas industry is undergoing a period of rapid growth. Nearly 
$US 350 billion of gas projects are underway or in various stages of planning in the 
conventional and unconventional (e.g. coal-seam gas) space (BCA, 2012; Rennie, 2013). 
These projects have considerable interface with the environment due to their scope and scale 
(Scott et al., 2011). For instance, the coal-seam gas (CSG) to Liquified Natural gas (LNG) 
projects in Queensland will require thousands of kilometers of buried transportation pipelines 
connecting thousands of geographically dispersed wells to centralised LNG production 
facilities (ABC, 2012). At present, the Australian oil and gas industry provides a unique 
opportunity to assess the impact of environmental regulation on firms operating in this 
environment and in particular, how regulation affects innovation. Our paper therefore poses 
the question: How does environmental regulation relate to the introduction of innovation in 
Australian oil and gas firms?  
The starting point of this investigation is Porter’s (1991) hypothesis that 
environmental regulation spurs innovation. However, we broaden this narrow ‘stimulus-
response’ perspective (Ambec et al., 2011) by including firm-level factors of competitiveness 
and collaboration. We include competitive aspects because current theorising suggests firms 
over-comply with regulations in the development of innovations to maintain competitive 
advantage, rather than being driven by regulation (Berkhout, 2014; Sarker, 2013). This is 
because over-compliance helps to shape the nature of future regulation (and therefore the 
competitive landscape) and shores up ‘social license’ to operate by anticipating the needs of 
social stakeholders thereby ensuring long-term viability of the enterprise (Berkhout, 2014; 
Gunningham et al., 2004; Wu, 2009). We include collaborative aspects because we recognise 
that the networks of firms operating in particular industries manage the impact of regulation 
and create innovation (Gann and Salter, 2000; Kemp et al., 2000).  
We base our analysis on a representative cross-section of the entire supply chain of 
the Australian upstream oil and gas (exploration and production) industry. This unique data 
set enables us to develop and test regression models to understand the relationship of 
environmental regulation with several types of innovation introduced at the firm level. These 
models also include ‘competitive advantage’ constructs and other variables that investigate 
the capability to deal with, and the propensity to over-comply with, regulations at the firm 
level. To contextualise our findings, particularly the specific nature of environmental 
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regulations affecting firms, we present five cases of innovation within the CSG industry in 
Queensland, Australia.  
Our paper makes three main contributions that together show the relationship between 
regulation and innovation is complex and multi-level. First, we find some support for the 
original version of Porter Hypothesis and the traditional top-down view of regulation. Our 
models reveal that environmental regulatory burden relates strongly to product and service 
innovations as well as all types of novel innovations. Second, we find some contextual 
support that collaborative regulatory schemes relate to these same types of innovation from 
our examples in the CSG industry. Third and most important, we contribute empirical 
evidence that these innovation types are strongly related to firm-level competitive 
differentiators, research and development (R&D) activity and formal collaboration with other 
firms. We posit the relationship with capabilities reflects the propensity of firms to go beyond 
compliance as a competitive strategy and to maintain social licence to operate (Berkhout, 
2014; Innes and Bial, 2002; Sarker, 2013; Wu 2009). We postulate the importance of 
collaboration indicates network effects relating to the entire supply chain organising in 
response to regulation and produce innovation (Gann and Salter, 2000; Kemp et. al., 2000). 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. First, a review of the broader 
literature on innovation as a response to environmental regulation, in the vein of Porter 
(1991) and Porter and Van der Linde (1995), reveals reliance on proxy measures and an 
equivocal set of findings. There we also review more recent research on why firms go beyond 
compliance as a competitive strategy to buttress the long-term viability of the firm. Second, 
the research methods section describes the quantitative approach of the paper. There we 
discuss the survey, exploratory factor analysis, the variables included in the models and the 
logistic regression procedures. This section also describes the collection of qualitative data in 
the form of a purposeful sample of executive interviews and conference proceedings that help 
illustrate the quantitative findings. Third, the analysis and discussion section presents the 
models and explores the findings through illustrative case examples. Finally, the conclusion 
section summarises our findings and contributions and explains the theoretical and practical 
implications of our findings.  
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 Early views on regulatory response 
Economists view regulation as a necessary response to account for the absence of a 
market for environmental impact (Jaffe et al., 2005). In the traditional view there are two 
general categories of policy instrument for inhibiting environmental degradation: market 
based approaches and ‘command and control’ standards (Popp et al., 2009). Market based 
mechanisms, such as emissions trading, allow firms to determine the best way to become 
more efficient (Lange and Bellas, 2005; Newell et al., 1999; Wu, 2009). ‘Command and 
control’ regulation prescribes processes and technology to meet specific environmental 
targets (Managi et al., 2005; Purvis and Outlaw, 1995). 
Early on it was argued that policing and implementing regulations was inefficient, 
costly and can erode competitive advantage. The argument was progressed that regulation is 
an additional cost to firms and erodes opportunities for increased business performance, and 
is thought to confer advantage to firms that operate under less stringent regulations (Freeman 
and Haveman, 1972). In this traditional view of regulation, firms would only choose to 
exceed regulation if there were financial benefits of doing so (Gunningham et al., 2004; 
Porter and van der Linde, 1995). 
Porter (1991), in an article published in Scientific American, claimed that 
environmental regulation spurs innovation and that this innovation can outweigh the costs of 
compliance and provide benefits. Many efforts have been undertaken to test the so-called 
‘Porter Hypothesis’, delivering mixed results and leaving a swath of conflicting evidence to 
inform managers and policy makers. For instance, some evidence supports the relationship 
between regulation and innovation (Lanjouw and Mody, 1996), while other studies find no 
connection to either (Jaffe and Palmer, 1997). A study on German manufacturing showed no 
evidence that the intense existing regulatory structure impeded firms ability to compete 
internationally (Triebswetter and Hitchens, 2005). Some studies find intense regulation is 
related to increased productivity in turn explained by adoption of technology (Berman and 
Bui, 2001), and yet others find that environmental regulation only slightly contributes to 
overall productivity declines (Christainsen and Haveman, 1981).   
Many justifications exist to explain the difficulty in finding clear relationships 
between regulation, innovation and performance. As Porter and van der Linde recognise, 
“Innovation cannot always completely offset the cost of compliance, especially in the short 
term before learning can reduce the cost of innovation based solutions” (Porter and van der 
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Linde, 1995, p.100). Other difficulties in observing such relationships have to do with the 
sometimes lengthy time frames associated with innovation and the time it takes to diffuse and 
be adopted, which creates ambiguity in measurement (Popp et al., 2009). Another issue 
contributing to ambiguity is the extensive use of industry level proxies like patents 
(Brunnermeier and Cohen, 2003; Hascic et al., 2008; Popp, 2006). 
The type of regulation itself has been shown to promote or inhibit innovation, but this 
too has led to conflicting findings. ‘Command and control’ regulation is thought to 
disincentivise new innovation development because of its focus on specific technology and 
minimum standards (Managi et al., 2005; Purvis and Outlaw, 1995). While innovation is 
induced by prescriptive regulation, unless properly designed it lacks incentives for further 
innovation (Yabar et al., 2013). For instance, Managi, Opaluch, Jin and Grigalunas (2005) 
found that in the US offshore oil and gas industry, the inflexibility of the ‘command and 
control’ environment was related to a lag in environmental performance, and encouraged 
serial adoption of technology from other industries. Market based mechanisms in contrast are 
thought to promote innovation by allowing firms to determine the best methods to achieve 
compliance (Lange and Bellas, 2005; Newell et al., 1999; Wu, 2009). However, Sharma 
(2001) studied the difference between ‘command and control’ style regulations and more 
flexible environmental regulations on innovation between the US and Canadian oil and gas 
industries and found no significant difference in the outcome for environmental performance. 
The conflicting evidence of the relationship between regulation and innovation calls for 
alternative perspectives that include other explanatory factors, including those at the firm 
level. 
2.2 Beyond compliance and the role of the firm 
The traditional top-down view of regulation is becoming secondary to the notion that 
firms regularly exceed compliance for reasons related to social license, and this is a primary 
mechanism that spurs innovation at the firm-level (Berkhout, 2014; Gunningham et. al., 
2004; Sarker, 2013). The concept of social license stems from increasing consumer 
awareness and proliferation of influential stakeholder groups that exert influence beyond the 
traditional governmental roles (Berkhout, 2014). Neglecting social concerns has drastic 
negative impacts on performance. Monsanto’s failure to address the concerns with genetically 
modified food in Europe led to an erosion of trust, and necessitated a rebranding of the 
corporation. Similarly, Nike’s perceived exploitation of labour in developing countries 
directly impacted the firm and lead to a damage of the brand (Gunningham et al., 2004).  
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Thus, firms now realise that they must maintain social license to operate and are 
increasingly undertaking efforts to do so (Berkhout, 2014; Pellegrino and Lodhia, 2012; 
Sarker, 2013).  To do this they must proactively anticipate the social acceptableness of 
products, even to the point where in some circumstances this is unprofitable (Gunningham et 
al., 2004). This is in an effort to maintain good public reputation, and to inculcate strong 
community relationships that support future viability of the enterprise (Sharma, 2001). This 
strategic commitment to sustainability means that subsequent innovations are responsive and 
proactive to social and environmental needs, in turn helping ensure long-term viability of the 
firm (Berkhout, 2014). Evidence from the construction industry reveals managerial concern 
as the most significant driver for adoption of green practices. Stakeholders pressures do not 
seem to influence adoption at all and regulations only appear significant driver for large firms 
(Qi et al., 2010). 
Further, going beyond compliance can shape the regulatory landscape, influencing the 
progression of regulation as a risk reduction strategy (Berkhout, 2014). For example, mining 
and oil and gas trade-groups are developing voluntary codes of conduct relating to social and 
environmental regulations (Sarker, 2013b). The Australian Petroleum Production and 
Exploration Association’s (APPEA) code of conduct endorses voluntary behaviors regarding 
continuous improvement of health safety and environmental performance (APPEA, 2013: 
Sarker, 2013). Such codes of conduct can arguably preempt the promulgation of more formal 
‘command and control’ regulation (Sarker, 2013).   
Beyond maintaining social license as a risk reduction strategy, over-compliance is 
quickly becoming recognised as a major source of competitive advantage (Berkhout, 2014). 
Indeed, voluntary norms around environmental regulation have been shown to spur managers 
into pursuing proactive environmental management strategies leading to competitive 
advantage, an effect not seen with command and control regulations (López-Gamero et al., 
2010). Exceeding compliance contributes to firms’ competitive positioning, ensuring that the 
firm maintains a continual pipeline of differentiated products that do not have inherent 
environmental limitations (Wu, 2009). Over-compliance helps shape the future regulatory 
landscape for the competition (Berkhout, 2014; Sarker 2013, Wu, 2009). When firms raise 
environmental performance benchmarks for products, it may prompt regulators toward 
stricter compliance regimes creating new benchmarks for their competitors, and may 
represent barriers to entry (Innes and Bial, 2002).  
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2.3 Expectations for Australian oil and gas regulation and innovation 
The literature review reveals that top-down regulation plays an ambiguous role in the 
innovation process, although it seems that less-prescriptive regulation can perhaps spur more 
innovation than ‘command and control’ strategies. Variability in the industries studied and 
the methods used undoubtedly contributes to this ambiguity. In contrast, there is more recent 
and compelling theory that firms are now exceeding compliance in order to use it as a 
competitive strategy and to ensure long-term viability (Berkhout, 2014; López-Gamero et al., 
2010; Sarker, 2013; Wu, 2009). Thus the combination of regulation (top-down) and firm-
level strategy (bottom-up) appears to be the most accurate means to investigate how firms 
within particular industries innovate with regard to the environment (Sarker, 2013). 
As such, first we anticipate that existing regulations will have a positive effect on 
innovation in a basic view of the Porter Hypothesis (Porter, 1991; Porter and Van der Linde, 
1995). This can be measured by using survey data on perceived environmental regulatory 
burden at the firm level. Second, we anticipate that the innovative response is even stronger if 
the regulation is developed in conjunction between industry and regulators (Harrison, 2002, 
1999; Sarker, 2013b), or at least more collaborative and less-prescriptive in nature (Lange 
and Bellas, 2005; Newell et al., 1999; Wu, 2009) since this allows for the development of 
more creative solutions. Since we cannot observe this second form of innovation response 
directly from our survey data, this notion is explored using case examples.  
Third and most importantly, in line with current theory, we expect that the industry 
will innovate because of the high stakes associated with losing social license (Sarker, 2013). 
Therefore we postulate innovation will be strongly related to firms that have higher levels of 
competitive capabilities (Berkhout, 2014; Gunningham et. al., 2004; Sarker, 2013) including 
those that conduct R&D, as well as being more prevalent in firms that pursue formal inter-
organisational collaboration (Gann and Salter, 2000; Kemp et. al., 2000). 
3 Research Method  
A survey instrument was used to capture data from firms operating in the oil and gas industry 
of Australia. After exploring descriptive data and correlations, we conducted exploratory 
factor analyses and logistic regressions using IBM SPSS Statistics 19. Logistic regressions 
based upon Maximum Likelihood Estimating (MLE) techniques were employed. In total we 
explored four regression models with various groups of innovation types (Damanpour, 1991). 
Qualitative data from primary and public sources are employed to discuss and provide 
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illustrative support for the findings of the models. The following sections expand on this 
approach.  
The use of primary data in this paper is governed by The University of Queensland’s 
ethics approval process. 
3.1 Survey 
Data were collected using a well-tested innovation survey instrument (Cosh et al., 2012) that 
is based on internationally recognised set of innovation and collaboration measures (OECD, 
2005). The survey was administered by phone to the executive level membership of APPEA.  
We address selection bias in two ways, first by comparing the sample to the sample 
frame, and second through a t-test of means between early and late responders. On the first 
point our sample represents over a quarter of the actual population and accurately reflects the 
industry profile. We know this because our survey targeted the membership of the leading 
industry trade group which claims to represent 98 per cent of the firms operating the 
upstream oil and gas industry in Australia (APPEA, 2013). Of the 290 firms targeted, 27.6 
per cent responded, which is on par with executive-level response rates in business research 
(Baruch, 1999). In addition proportions of our sample, in terms of the number of oil and gas 
operators versus all others, are nearly identical to the sample frame (Table 1).  
On the second point, we conducted an independent samples t-test of means (two-
tailed) using the variables from our models by splitting the sample into early and late 
responses (mid-point of a 39-day collection campaign) (de Villiers et al., 2010). The only 
significant difference we found was in the industry control variable ‘SERVICE’. This was 
anticipated since we prioritised the oil and gas operator firms because of expected difficulty 
in accessing their executives. Despite this known bias in our sample collection method, there 
is still no significant mean differences in the variables of interest between groups. For these 
reasons we feel strongly that selection bias is not a concern. 
 
Table 1- Representativeness of sample 
Type Sample obtained 
No.          per cent 
 Sample Frame 
No.          per cent 
Operators 25 31  94 32 
All others 55 69  203 68 
 80 100  297 100 
 
In addition to the standard variables usually obtained from this type of survey (see 
Table 2), the instrument was expanded to include several industry-specific contextual factors. 
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First, key differentiators for ‘competitive advantage’ were rated on a Likert scale (Table 3). 
Second, regulatory factors that served as limitations to reaching business objectives were also 
rated on a five point Likert scale as listed in Table 3.  
3.2 Variables 
3.2.1 Dependent variables 
Our survey enquired about the introduction of six innovation types during the past three 
years. We also asked if these types of innovation were new-to-the-firm or new-to-the-firm 
and industry. 
 
Table 2 - Innovation types measured in survey, introduced in prior three years 
Innovation  Description 
Product Technologically new or significantly improved physical product / technology 
Process Technologically new or significantly improved methods of producing a physical product / technology 
Distribution  Technological improvements in supply, storage or distribution systems for physical product / 
technology 
Service New or significantly improved ‘service product’ 
Service Delivery New method to produce and deliver your ‘service product’ 
Managerial New organisational/managerial processes or marketing methods 
 
We consolidated the innovation types into four dichotomous dependent variables 
(Table 4). The first two variables, NOVEL and INCREMENTAL, indicate varying degrees of 
novelty. The NOVEL variable indicates that the firm had at least one innovation (of the types 
listed in Table 2) that was both new-to-the-firm and new-to-the-industry. INCREMENTAL 
innovations indicate at least one innovation was only new-to-the-firm (and not to the 
industry) (Köhler et al., 2012). We also created the variable PRODSERV that indicates the 
presence of either a product or a service innovation (any degree of novelty). Similarly we also 
created the PROC variable that relates to the internal processes of the firms indicating the 
presence of any distribution, process, service delivery or managerial innovations (any degree 
of novelty) (Damanpour, 1991). 
3.2.2 Independent variables 
First, we selected three independent variables from our survey that related directly to 
regulatory issues: government regulations and compliance (red-tape) termed RED; 
environmental compliance (green-tape) termed GREEN and environmental regulatory 
uncertainty termed UNCERT. Firms were asked whether each “acted as a significant 
limitation or barrier on your ability to meet your business objectives.” Each variable was 
transformed into a binary variable by assigning a ‘1’ to the Likert scale responses of four and 
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above (4 - Very Significant Limitation and 5 - Crucial limitation) and ‘0’ to the other 
responses. 
Second, we developed constructs for competitive advantage in an effort explore the 
notion that environmental innovation is a competitive strategy (Berkhout, 2014; Sarker, 2013; 
Wu, 2009). Using exploratory factor analysis (EFA) with Varimax rotation, we revealed two 
latent constructs for competitive advantage based upon questions regarding firms’ “key 
differentiators”. One major construct emerged (Table 3), which we termed “STANDING” 
and that relates to firms’ ability to maintain reputation, breadth and depth of expertise and 
provide consistent project execution success. STANDING has a Cronbach alpha of .811. 
Another latent key differentiator construct we termed “NETWORKING”, and it has a 
Cronbach alpha of .680. These were both within the range suggested by (Hair et. al., 1998). 
The NETWORKING construct relates to the partnership network firms maintain and the 
ability to leverage those networks into new products and services. 
Table 3- EFA for competitive advantage constructs 
Rotated Component Matrix
a
 
  
Component 
Standing Networking Operations 
Range of expertise/products/services/technology .855     
Established reputation .769   
Specialised expertise/product/service/technology .764     
Ability to execute on projects in a timely manner .701   
Marketing and promotion skills  .838   
Partner network & related arrangements   .793   
Stakeholder management (e.g. soliciting and actively managing 
feedback, across project life cycle) 
 .565  
Health, Safety, Security and Environmental record     .887 
Supply chain management and integration    .681 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
Third, due to the collaborative nature of the industry, we employed the variable 
COLLAB which measures whether or not the firm participated in any formal collaboration. 
We sharpened the definition of collaboration to that which is beyond the normal day-to-day 
operations of the firm that is intended to improving some aspect of the business. A summary 
of the variables used in the modelling is shown in Table 4. 
3.2.3 Controls 
Control variables included the conduct of R&D and the industry control of SERVICE that 
relates to firms that are not oil and gas operators. We also included the natural logarithm of 
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size (LOG_SIZE) measured by the number of full time staff. The log-transformation 
remedied the non-normal distribution in these data. 
 
Table 4 – Variables  
 Description 
Dependent variables  
INCREMENTAL Firm reported any innovations across size types that is new to the firm NOT new to the 
industry, introduced within the last three years coded “1” yes, or “0” no.  
NOVEL Firm reported any innovations across size types that is new to the firm AND new to the 
industry, introduced within the last three years coded “1” yes, or “0” no.  
PRODSERV Firm reported any product or service innovations in the last three years Coded “1” yes, or “0” 
no. 
PROC Firm reported any Distribution, Process, Service Delivery or managerial innovation in the 
last three years. Coded “1” yes, or “0” no. 
Independent variables  
RED Factors have acted as a significant limitation or barrier on your ability to meet your business 
objectives: Government regulations and compliance (red-tape). Likert scale value of 4- very 
significant limitation or higher encoded 1.  
GREEN Environmental compliance (green-tape) treated same as above. 
UNCERT Environmental regulatory uncertainty treated same as above. 
STANDING Four variable construct with Cronbach Alpha of .811. How would you rate your competitive 
advantages on a scale 1- Not a competitive advantage, 5 – key differentiator. See Table 3 
NETWORKING Three variable construct with Cronbach Alpha of .680. How would you rate your 
competitive advantages on a scale 1- Not a competitive advantage, 5 – key differentiator. See 
Table 3. 
COLLAB Dummy for collaboration “1” – any, “0” none.  
Controls  
RD_DUM Dummy for conduct of R&D “1” – any, “0” none. 
SERVICE Dummy for industry position, takes a value of “1” for all firms that are not oil and gas 
operators, “0” if oil and gas operator. 
LOG_SIZE Natural logarithm of size 
 
3.3 Qualitative data 
To provide contextual support for the models we also collected qualitative data. We chose 
our cases using purposive sampling to construct appropriate illustrative case studies to 
explore the relationships observed in the quantitative data. A theoretical sampling frame was 
developed to collect qualitative data consisting of three industry tiers: operators, contractors, 
and suppliers (Crabtree et al., 1997). Operators have legal responsibility for upstream oil and 
gas exploration and production and organise this work through a supply chain of consisting of 
contractors and service providers. Contractors work directly with operators (or sometimes 
under Engineering Procurement and Construction (EPC) contractors) and provide a range of 
services from drilling to construction and logistics. Finally, Suppliers include those who 
supply basic material goods up to specialised material / service providers. Examples include 
geotechnical services and land rehabilitation services.  
Two sources of data were used to fill this theoretical frame. The first data source are 
papers presented at APPEA’s Inaugural CSG conference held in Brisbane in October 2012. 
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This was the first industry trade group conference specifically focused on CSG held in 
Australia. CSG projects represent over $US 50b in infrastructure investment in Queensland 
(BCA, 2012). The second source of data was interviews conducted by the authors in 2012 
with executives firms operating in the Australian oil and gas industry. Selected interviews 
and presentations were transcribed from our larger set in order to fill the theoretical frame as 
appropriate (Table 5). 
 
Table 5- Qualitative examples invoked in discussion section 
 
Theoretical 
frame level  
Organisation Type Level Topic 
Operators Arrow Energy Conference 
Transcripts 
Project manager 
 
Brine management of coal seam gas 
associated water 
 
 GLNG Project, Santos 
Limited 
 
 Manager  CSG water, benefits beyond the project 
life-cycle 
 
Contractors  Cardno ENTRIX  Executive 
 
Beneficial reuse of CSG produced water 
 
 Murphy Pipe & Civil  Executive Gas and water pipeline construction and 
installation 
 
Suppliers Groundworks Interview Executive Land rehabilitation, re-vegetation 
 
4 Analysis and Discussion 
4.1 Findings 
First, we turn to the regulatory factors and the relationship to innovation. From the bivariate 
correlation matrix in Insert Table 6 it can be seen that all three of the regulatory factors 
(RED, GREEN, UNCERT) are highly and positively correlated. However, the impact on 
innovation differs for each (Table 7). We find no significant relationship between innovation 
and general regulatory constraints (RED tape) or environmental regulatory uncertainty 
(UNCERT) in our models. However, environmental regulatory constraints (GREEN tape) 
relates positively to innovation. In fact, firms citing high GREEN tape are three times more 
likely to introduce novel innovations (any type, e.g. product, service and process) and nearly 
four times for products/services innovations (both novel and incremental). GREEN tape is 
not related to INCREMENTAL innovation or with firms’ internal innovations (PROC).  
Second, firm-level capabilities appear to relate strongly to innovation in models where 
environmental burden is high. In models where GREEN tape is high (the NOVEL and 
PRODSERV models), the construct we term STANDING is significant and positive. This 
means that technological breadth and depth, the ability to conduct projects and a strong 
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reputation in tandem provide either the basis for dealing adeptly with environmental 
regulatory constraints, and perhaps supports the ‘beyond compliance’ hypothesis (Berkhout, 
2014). Another capability-related construct, NETWORKING, is significant in the 
PRODSERV models and implies that latent relationships with supply chain partners support 
the development of new innovation. This insight is in line with the thinking of Kemp, et al., 
(2000), which posits that networks of firms coordinate to respond to the regulatory challenges 
in particular industries. The finding that this is most likely associated with firms operating at 
lower levels of the supply chain (e.g. are not oil and gas operators) is supported by research 
on the upstream oil and gas industry (Perrons and Donnelly, 2012) and other service-
enhanced industries like construction (Gann and Salter, 2000).  
Third, maintaining formal collaborations and conducting R&D appears to be even 
more important to innovation than firm-level competitive capabilities in the models where 
environmental regulatory burden is high. Collaboration and R&D are both important in the 
PRODSERV and NOVEL models. The PRODSERV model implies that firms conducting 
R&D are, with high probability, capable of producing innovation in light of environmental 
regulatory constraints. Previous research suggests this is indicative of the absorptive capacity 
of a firm, that is, its potential to learn from external firm engagements (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990). In our context, we take this to mean that firms who do not conduct R&D or engage in 
formal collaborations will lack the ability to meet the regulatory challenge and innovate, or 
moreover, will not see the competitive advantage of doing so (Berkhout, 2014). 
Fourth, the industry control variable reveals that PRODSERV innovations are not 
related to industry position. This means the relationships between environmental regulations, 
capabilities, collaboration and R&D are robust and apply to the entire supply chain which is 
an important finding. In contrast, NOVEL, INCREMENTAL and PROC are most likely to be 
SERVICE firms (not oil and gas operators).  
 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
--------------------------------- 
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Table 7 - Logistic Regression Results (N=80) 
 
NOVEL 
 
INCREMENTAL 
 
PRODSERV 
 
PROC 
 
 
Odd sig Odd sig Odd sig Odd sig 
RED  0.91  
 
 1.59  
 
 1.42  
 
 0.98  
 
GREEN  3.18  *  1.09  
 
 3.93  *  1.59  
 
UNCERT  0.60  
 
 0.86  
 
 0.48  
 
 1.50  
 
STANDING  2.03  **  1.39  
 
 1.83  **  1.54  * 
NETWORKING  1.43  
 
 3.29  ***  1.53  *  1.89  ** 
COLLAB  3.11  **  2.11  
 
 4.58  **  0.75  
 
RD  6.61  ***  4.43  ***  11.31  ***  2.32  * 
SERVICE  2.72  *  2.95  *  1.44  
 
 3.21  ** 
LOG_SIZE  1.00  
 
 0.72  **  0.77  **  1.08  
 
Chi-square 29.459 
 
25.419 
 
29.443 
 
15.288 
 
df 9 
 
9 
 
9 
 
9 
 
Sig. .001 
 
.003 
 
.001 
 
.083 
 Nagelkerke R Square .420 
 
.371 
 
.422 
 
.252 
 *. Correlation is significant at the 10% level (1-tailed), ** 5% level (1-tailed), *** 1% level (1-tailed). 
4.2 Exploring the model results through examples 
This section uses contextual examples from the Australian oil and gas industry to explore the 
links between innovation, capabilities, collaboration and environmental burden found in the 
models. In particular we aim to provide regulatory framework nuance that our models cannot. 
First, we look toward the CSG to LNG industry in Queensland, Australia, where we review 
produced water challenge the industry faces. Second, we provide a summary of the emerging 
CSG produced water environmental regulatory regime. Third, we explore the potential 
implications of these policies on innovation. Fourth, we examine specific examples of 
innovation examples within this context.  
Although we use Queensland CSG innovation examples to contextualise our model 
results, it is important to remember the models reflect both conventional and unconventional 
oil and gas and represent firms from all regions of Australia. Over half of sample consists of 
firms headquartered in Western Australia, and over a third report conventional oil and gas 
interests. Further, we know of similar environmentally related innovation occurring in 
conventional gas developments. Two examples from the US$52 billion dollar Gorgon gas 
development project by Chevron on Barrow Island, Western Australia help prove this point. 
First, LNG production trains have completely modularised for the first time on such scale to 
minimise footprint and disturbance of the land – a world first. Second, a purpose-built, 
award-winning quarantine management system that decontaminates equipment, modules and 
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staff has been developed to maintain the island’s ‘class A’ nature reserve status (UNAA, 
2012).  
 
4.2.1 The CSG produced water challenge 
The Australian CSG industry must treat significant volumes of produced water containing 
metals and large quantities of saline produced during operations (Nghiem et al., 2011). CSG 
wells can produce water for up to 15 years (Nghiem et al., 2011), requiring long term 
solutions to this large-scale challenge. Salinity levels are high in this produced water, 
exceeding waste water discharge levels. For example, at Arrow Energy’s Surat Basin 
operations water salinity can reach upwards of 5,000 parts per million (ppm), well above the 
acceptable water use level of 1,000ppm (Sherriff, 2012). Over the 20 to 40 year life cycle of 
Arrow’s CSG operations, they estimate 2-2.5M tonnes of salt will be produced with daily 
peaks of 400-500 tonnes per day and averaging around 200 tonnes of salt per day (Sherriff, 
2012).  
4.2.2  CSG water regulation and policy 
Unlike most Australian states that regulate produced water purely as a waste, Queensland 
Government is treating produced water as a resource to be strategically managed (Tormey, 
2012). The Coal Seam Gas Water Management Policy published by Queensland Government 
“encourages the beneficial use of CSG water in a way that protects the environment and 
maximises its productive use as a valuable resource disposal (Queensland Government, 
2012a, p.1)”. The document prioritises beneficial reuse for the environment, existing or new 
water users or new water dependent industries over treatment and disposal. For the brine by-
product, the Government supports the development of useable products over disposal.  
The Queensland Government’s Approval of Coal Seam Gas Water for Beneficial Use 
guidelines promote “beneficial use” options that work within the existing regulatory 
framework. The policy “does not specify treatment standards or methods; rather indicates 
criteria to be met for the use of CSG water” for particular beneficial use options (Queensland 
Government, 2012b, p. 4). The Coal Seam Gas Water Management Policy however, also 
outlines outstanding regulatory changes the Government intends to make that will ensure 
beneficial use projects are likely to be undertaken by industry (Queensland Government, 
2012a). These future actions include amending the 1994 Environmental Production Act with 
new CSG water quality standards to avoid classification as a regulated waste, to reduce 
 17 
 
duplication of regulation stemming from the Water Supply Act of 2008 and to develop clear 
standards for CSG water irrigation schemes (Queensland Government, 2012a).  
4.2.3 Policy implications on innovation 
Faced with the produced water challenge but guided by policy that encourages water and salt 
reuse, firms in the CSG sector of Queensland are undertaking considerable investment to 
develop technological solutions. A report by the GasFields Commission Queensland found 
188 CSG water-related science and research projects either completed or underway (as of 
October 2012) that directly link to the Queensland CSG sector (Raine, 2012). The majority of 
these projects are focused on groundwater hydrology. The second most frequent research area 
was surface water management including produced water treatment, discharge and reuse 
efforts like irrigation (Raine, 2012).  
 
4.2.4 Illustrative case study examples of innovation 
Against the background of the CSG produced water challenge and seemingly favorable 
regulatory context, we explore specific examples of innovation. The following paragraphs 
elaborate upon several qualitative examples that support the empirical findings summarised 
in Table 8.  
 18 
 
Table 8- Illustrative case study examples and linkage to findings 
 
Theoretical 
frame 
Organisation Innovation Summary 
Link to 
dependent 
variables 
Link to 
independent 
variables 
Links to 
Controls 
Operators Arrow Energy Development of CSG water 
treatment with salt and carbonate 
recovery systems  
 
PRODSERV, 
NOVEL 
GREEN, 
STANDING** 
R&D 
 GLNG Project, 
Santos Limited 
 
First CSG agricultural irrigation 
pilot operation, and continued 
development of technology and 
beneficial use applications 
including livestock watering 
 
PRODSERV, 
NOVEL 
GREEN; 
STANDING** 
R&D 
Contractors Cardno 
ENTRIX 
Tailored water recycle and 
beneficial use engineering 
services for CSG operators and 
R&D for heat recovery from 
groundwater 
 
PRODSERV, 
NOVEL 
GREEN , 
COLLAB  
SERVICE*, 
R&D 
 Murphy Pipe & 
Civil 
Rapid gas and water pipeline 
construction and installation using 
an adapted German 
telecommunication ploughing 
technology 
 
PRODSERV; 
NOVEL 
GREEN, 
COLLAB  
SERVICE*, 
R&D 
Suppliers Groundworks Land rehabilitation, re-vegetation 
through in-licensed technology 
adapted to grow trees 
PRODSERV, 
NOVEL 
GREEN, 
COLLAB 
SERVICE*, 
R&D 
*refers to the industry control variable indicating this firm is NOT an oil and gas operator 
** Example appears to be internal sourced/managed project to our knowledge thus would appear breadth/depth of technical 
expertise, reputation, are important factors 
 
Arrow Energy undertook a lengthy study of CSG water management practices for 
their operations in the Surat Basin. Arrow evaluated several technology-driven scenarios for 
beneficial reuse that included capital investment, project life operating costs and 
abandonment costs and non-economic criteria such as ease of resource recovery, land impact, 
constructability and greenhouse gas emissions. Arrow found that traditional options like 
evaporation ponds are becoming dearer, due to the environmental regulatory constraints 
including pond linings, environmental monitoring and abandonment costs including soil 
characterisation and potential remediation costs (Tormey, 2012). Also, the Surat Basin is 
located far from the ocean precluding brine discharge options. It is also not conducive 
geologically for brine injection, although the most economically appealing solution.  
Ultimately Arrow’s analysis identified selective salt recovery technology as the 
preferred solution (Sherriff, 2012). Although simple salt recovery options are readily 
available and technologically feasible, recovering carbonates - another by-product in the 
Surat Basin - in addition to chloride salts would reap significant economic benefits if 
efficiencies of scale can be achieved. Arrow continues to pursue this most technologically 
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complex and energy intense reuse option, recognising it is also a preferred option in the view 
of the regulators (Sherriff, 2012). 
 Santos is using CSG-produced water to improve the regional agricultural through crop 
irrigation. Santos developed a drip irrigation system, the first such application of CSG water 
irrigation in Australia, called the Mount Hope Pilot and continues to trial new and improved 
pilot test systems. Their GLNG project is estimated to produce around 340 giga-litres of 
water, 200 – 250 giga-litres of which will be utilised for irrigation to re-establish native 
landscapes and as water for livestock in the Fairview and Arcadia Valley geographic regions 
(Davidge, 2012).  
Cardno ENTRIX, an environmental and water engineering consultancy, is playing an 
active role in the effort to optimize technical solutions for Queensland’s CSG operators. On 
the exploratory side of research, Cardno is investigating geothermal energy production and 
waste heat recovery technology relating to coal seam and shale gas in collaboration with 
United States Department of Energy National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) 
(Tormey, 2012). On engineering related efforts, Cardno is working directly with Australian 
firms following a three-step CSG water management framework to optimise energy usage 
and water volume reduction. First, characterisation of the basin-specific produced water 
quality must be undertaken. Second, identification of beneficial uses must be conducted. 
Third, matching treatment technologies with source characteristics and the quality 
requirement of beneficial uses thus optimising the technology to the overall dynamics of the 
field (Tormey, 2012).  
Murphy Pipe and Civil has adapted a German ploughing technology used to bury 
telecommunications and power cables into one that lays large diameter high density 
polyethylene (HDPE) pipe (Campbell, 2012) going beyond the simple regulatory stipulation 
that pipelines must be buried (Rennie, 2013). There are direct environmental benefits 
associated with Murphy’s plough because it minimises the disturbance of top soil compared 
to traditional trenching operations. As the managing director recalled in his speech “there’s 
no mixing of subterranean soils so the plough basically lifts the soil and goes back down. 
There is no churning or excavation” (Campbell, 2012). The plough actually inserts pipe as it 
moves forward, allowing the pipe to stay in place. It can operate with only ten metre 
easements (compared with 30 to 50 metres in other methods) and can lay up to ten kilometres 
of pipe in a single day. Guided by GPS, the system also helps minimise rework on the pipe 
once laid. To develop this innovation Murphy worked with one of the industry CSG operators 
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to re-design the machine to suit the operating requirements in Australia, incorporating over 
90 changes since 2009 (Campbell, 2012). 
Another environmental implication of CSG is the quantity of produced water that will 
far exceed demands for beneficial use (Nghiem et al., 2011), and will temporarily need 
captured in large holding ponds. Once built, these holding ponds are typically sowed with 
grass to secure their earthen embankments. This approach, according to Groundworks Pty 
CEO Tony Rees, performs poorly because typical grasses applied to the relatively acidic soils 
in parts of Queensland leads to poor root structure development. Thus, holding ponds treated 
in this manner require considerable upkeep, and in some cases embankments must be rebuilt 
when damaged by heavy rains (Rees, personal communication).  
To address this challenge Groundworks developed a one-time application of a 
modified Ecoblanket® product which quickly ensconces native trees and shrubs that have 
better root structures than grass alone. As the sole licensee of the technology in Australia and 
New Zealand, Groundworks enhanced this erosion control / re-vegetation technology to 
incorporate native seed mixtures containing grass, tree and shrub species which are tolerant to 
the high saline and acidic nature of Australian soils. Tony claims his product represents a 
marked improvement over normal methods, describing “completely stabilised ground cover 
within a couple of weeks and full cover with secondary species coming through after the 
cover crop in about six weeks.  And it’s completely stable.” Groundworks has applied this 
product on several CSG ponds embankments in Queensland (Rees, personal communication).   
Groundworks also collaborated with the UniQuest, a research commercialisation 
company co-located at The University of Queensland, to justify Ecoblanket® as a carbon 
offset method (Rees, personal communication). They found that re-vegetation including trees 
and shrubs based on the adapted Ecoblanket® technology produces 50 per cent more carbon 
sequestration than a normal planted forest. Based on these data, Groundwork’s filed to 
expand the current eligibility definitions within the of Australia’s Department of Climate 
Change and Energy Efficiency’s Carbon Farming Initiative (CF) to include forest established 
through direct seeding, planting or via spreading of Ecoblanket® (Rees, personal 
communication).  
On the one hand, the aforementioned CSG water innovations are perhaps a reflection 
of the collaborative, outcome-focused regulatory environment. On the other hand, it can be 
argued these examples show firms striving to make their operations very environmentally 
robust and going beyond compliance. For instance, Arrow is pursuing selective salt recovery 
which requires a significant investment in R&D to develop the process to achieve economies 
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of scale necessary to make the investment in the plant positive. Santos is striving to use water 
in the agriculture arena, tangentially supporting another important Australian industry and 
making it more sustainable in the process. Murphy Pipe and Civil’s pipeline burying 
technology, though not mandated to do so, minimises land disturbance and loss of topsoil.  
Groundwork’s process to grow trees from a single initial application of Ecoblanket may soon 
be approved to qualify for carbon offsets.  
Together these examples appear to reflect the propensity of firms to go beyond 
compliance in order to garner competitive advantage by bolstering social license. As Tony 
Ree’s laments, firms in the industry should all strive to exceed expectations on the social 
front, by returning the land to its original state. He says CSG firms should all strive to “give 
back to the community in the appropriate manner, you have less headaches, less costs, better 
engagement and you’re doing the right thing for the environment, as well as developing an 
economic model that’s benefiting the State, individual and communities. That’s the way it 
should been seen. Rehab shouldn’t be a dirty word.”  
5 Conclusions 
On a basic level we find some support for the original version of Porter Hypothesis and its 
top-down view that regulation spurs innovation. Using a representative cross section of the 
entire upstream oil and gas industry of Australia, we find that firms faced with high levels of 
regulatory burden are more likely to introduce product and service innovations, as well as 
innovations that are both new-to-the-industry and new-to-the-firm (i.e. novel).  
In an effort to contextualise this finding, we explored illustrative examples of 
innovations in the CSG industry and found some support that more collaborative regulation 
can help spur innovation. Our tentative evidence suggests that the less prescriptive nature of 
the regulatory approach taken by the Queensland government is supporting innovation. For 
example, the Queensland’s GasFields Commission report demonstrates high levels of CSG 
R&D activity (Raine, 2012), which we believe trumps alternative explanations such as 
industrial competitiveness regulations (Harrison, 1999, p. 53). We see evidence of innovation 
in our illustrative examples, from Arrow Energy and Santos efforts to develop salt and soda 
ash recovery technologies and beneficial reuses options for water, to Cardno ENTRIX 
support to multiple operators to develop similar technological solutions. Meanwhile, Murphy 
Pipe and Civil created a machine that buries 18” HDPE pipe continuously with minimal 
environmental impact from a German plough that formerly buried electric cable. Finally, 
 22 
 
Groundworks has innovated upon a licensed technology, Ecoblanket®, to grow trees and 
shrubs on CSG pond embankments where others only have planted grass, and is pursuing 
carbon offset accreditation. 
However, our findings go well beyond the top-down view which prioritises regulation 
intensity and type, and we find compelling evidence that the relationship between regulation 
and innovation is complex and firm-level competitive factors exert influence. We recognise 
that firms in increasing numbers over comply with regulation to gain competitive advantage 
and to maintain social license to operate (remain socially acceptable to active and well-
informed stakeholders) (Berkhout, 2014). Therefore innovation might reflect the propensity 
of firms go beyond compliance, in a more bottom-up perspective which is some ways pre-
emptive to regulation. To explore this relationship our models included firm-level factors 
relating to capability. We found product / service and novel innovations are simultaneously 
related to high regulatory burden and the presence of competitive capabilities, collaborative 
activity and R&D. Thus, it is the presence of all of these factors in tandem which explain 
innovation in this industry according to our models. Our illustrative case studies also support 
the close ties between innovation and internal capabilities (including R&D and 
collaboration). 
The finding that competitive capabilities relate to innovation in the face of regulatory 
burden is a very important empirical contribution to the literature on over-compliance as 
strategy (e.g. Berkhout, 2014). One interpretation of this finding is that firms with strong 
capabilities, when faced with tough environmental regulation, have the capacity to innovate 
in response. However, a more compelling interpretation of this finding is found in 
contemporary literature on how firms over-comply as a competitive strategy by garnering 
technological advantage over competitors (Innes and Bial, 2002; Wu, 2009) and bolstering 
social license to operate (Berkhout, 2014; Gunningham, 2004; Sarker 2013). The construct 
we find important in this regard is comprised of the breadth and depth of technological 
expertise, project management performance and a strong reputation. Increasing technological 
breadth and depth would appear to support the notion of garnering advantage over 
competitors by innovating in an environmental manner, while performing well on project 
(which as discussed this industry has a very high environmental interface) all the while 
maintaining a sterling reputation, appears to reflect issues of social license. Our cross-
sectional study limits our ability to reveal comment on directionality of these relationships 
and future research should strive to capture longitudinal effects in this regard. 
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 Playing an even more important role than competitive aspects in delivering innovation 
in the face of regulatory burden is external collaboration. Because our models are based upon 
a representative cross section of an industry supply chain, this finding reveals important 
empirical evidence of network affects, as firms organise into collaborations to deliver 
innovative solutions and respond to regulation. Further, while we see industry segmentation 
in the development of novel innovations (this is in the realm of suppliers rather than oil and 
gas operators) we see no such distinction in terms of product and service innovations. This 
latter finding in particular provides further evidence that the development of these important 
types of innovation is through a process of negotiation across the levels of the supply chain 
network (Gann and Salter, 2000; Kemp et. al., 2000).  
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Table 9 – Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlation matrix (Spearman’s rho) 
 
   Mean   SD  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 INCREMENTAL  0.63   0.49                          
        
                        
2 NOVEL  0.63   0.49  .253
*                       
        
.012                       
3 PRODSERV  0.64   0.48  .436** .705**                     
        
.000 .000                     
4 PROC  0.73   0.45  .564
** .622** .467**                   
        
.000 .000 .000                   
5 RED  0.49   0.50  .084 -.071 .059 -.015                 
        
.230 .266 .301 .446                 
6 GREEN  0.38   0.49  .013 .013 .101 .014 .484
**               
        
.453 .453 .187 .449 .000               
7 UNCERT  0.41   0.50  .072 .020 .104 .061 .504** .662**             
        
.262 .431 .180 .295 .000 .000             
8 STANDING  (0.00)  1.00  .036 .290
** .127 .194* -.199* -.202* -.094           
        
.376 .005 .131 .042 .039 .036 .203           
9 NETWORKING  0.00   1.00  .297** .106 .082 .195* .019 -.001 .030 -.079         
        
.004 .174 .236 .041 .434 .496 .395 .243         
10 COLLAB  0.73   0.45  .159 .275
** .293** .060 -.015 -.043 .061 .021 .120       
        
.079 .007 .004 .300 .446 .351 .295 .428 .144       
11 RD_DUM  0.55   0.50  .182 .389** .416** .174 -.123 -.078 .043 .078 -.082 .174     
        
.053 .000 .000 .061 .138 .246 .351 .245 .236 .061     
12 SERVICE  0.69   0.47  .146 .258
* .109 .249* -.206* -.258* -.257* .427** -.093 .008 .041   
        
.098 .011 .169 .013 .034 .011 .011 .000 .206 .474 .360   
13 LOG_SIZE  4.29   2.25  -.070 .246* .050 .207* -.303** -.199* -.164 .330** .103 .286** .243* .124 
        .269 .014 .331 .032 .003 .039 .073 .001 .182 .005 .015 .136 
 
*. Correlation is significant at the 5% level (1-tailed). **. Correlation is significant at the 1% level (1-tailed). 
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